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Abstract
Past research on the effects of District Attorney partisanship has not ac-
counted for the level of conservatism in the county, a likely confounding vari-
able. I build a theoretical model where DAs are influenced but not completely
beholden to the preferences of their constituents and use a fixed-effects re-
gression to show that, when controlling for county-conservatism, the effect of
DA partisanship on jail and prison admissions largely disappears, except in
the case of rural counties. This implies that, for the most part, DAs are sim-
ply implementing the preferred policy of their constituents, not allowing their
partisanship to influence them.
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1 Introduction and Motivation
In the United States, district attorneys (henceforth DAs) are the chief prosecutors
for the county of their jurisdiction. Recently, DAs have drawn increasing attention
for the wide breadth of policy-making power they wield when choosing which cases
to prioritize. These powers are exemplified by Philadelphia’s DA Larry Krasner,
who was elected in 2017 and quickly made large reforms to the office’s staff and
procedures, halting prosecution for marijuana possession cases and eliminating cash
bail (Trinacria, 2018). In a 2007 census, the Bureau of Justice Statistics found that
DA offices have a collective budget of 5.8 billion dollars, and annually close almost
3 million cases (Perry and Banks, 2011). These cases contribute to the persistent
phenomenon of mass incarceration as well as the less-discussed concern of jail misuse.
While most readers are likely familiar with the topic of mass incarceration in
prisons, some may be less familiar with jails. Jails are typically used to hold people
who are waiting for trial but either cannot make bail or were denied it. In contrast,
prisons typically hold people after they have been found guilty. The US has the
highest number of prisoners of any country in the world, and the second-highest per
capita, so there is a large literature studying the causes of this mass incarceration
(Walmsley, 2018). But jails are also of great importance in the American criminal
justice system. Inmates who were held in jail before trial are 3.32 times more likely
to be given a prison sentence, and those sentences are 2.36 times longer compared to
inmates who did not receive prior jail time, even when controlling for other relevant
characteristics (Lowenkamp et al., 2013). Further, jails charge fees for services such
as phone calls that can add up to thousands of dollars for people who are often
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already financially unstable (Krauth et al., 2005). To worsen matters for such people,
time spent in jail can be grounds for losing a job (Rodriguez and Emsellem, 2011).
For these reasons, criminal justice reform groups have referred to jails as the “front
door” of mass incarceration and “modern debtors prisons,” so they are certainly
worth studying to find the main predictors of their use (Subramanian et al., 2015;
Alexander et al., 2010). This paper seeks to study the effect of DA partisanship on
jail admissions rates, as well as replicate prior results on prisons while controlling for
a new variable, county-level conservatism.
There is nascent literature which finds evidence that DA partisanship has a sig-
nificant impact on prison admissions and sentencing lengths, however, none have
studied whether these results generalize to jail admissions rates (Krumholz, 2019;
Arora, 2018). It would be interesting to see if they do, because it provides a timeline
effect within the justice system. Is the DA’s impact already felt before trial, or can
we only observe it after they have had the chance to prosecute? Further, these prior
studies have not accounted for the key variable of county-level conservatism that has
been used in other studies in the field to show that the level of conservatism in a
county is a predictor of its criminal justice outcomes (Durante, 2020; Percival, 2010;
Cumley, 2012). DA partisanship prison studies not controlling for conservatism are
prone to omitted variable bias. It is important to distinguish the effect of conser-
vatism from the effect of partisanship because it changes where we lay agency, do DAs
affect admissions rates on their own, or do they only appear to do so because those
are the demands of their electorate? The answer has important impacts on policy
and reform efforts. Thus, here I seek to replicate the prison results but controlling
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for conservatism.
I create a theoretical model following median voter theory in which DAs are
influenced by the preferences of their district but do not have to adhere perfectly
to their constituents’ whims. This model predicts that DAs in rural counties will
be able to stray further from their constituents’ preferences when setting policy and
thus have more influence on outcomes, independent of county-level conservatism.
To test this theory, I use a fixed-effects regression model that controls for county,
and commuting zone per four years. This design helps control for both the ebbs and
flows of the local economy and several difficult-to-measure time-invariant county-level
factors such as local legislation or presence of organized crime, which may correlate
with both DA partisanship and admissions rates.
Moreover, I also control for several county-level time-varying factors such as me-
dian income, poverty rate, demographic shifts, and so on. I draw data from Krumholz
(2019), the Vera Insitute, the Census, and MIT’s county presidential election returns.
I split the sample into rural and non-rural counties and find that, except in the case
of rural jails, DA partisanship plays little role in predicting criminal justice outcomes
when controlling for conservatism. On the other hand, in both rural and non-rural




The literature for this topic is thin, to the best of my knowledge, only two papers
address district attorneys themselves in the context of prisons (Krumholz, 2019;
Arora, 2018), but several look at mass incarceration in general. There is very limited
research into what affects jail admissions rates.
The most relevant study for my purposes is Krumholz (2019), which assesses the
impact of district attorney political affiliation on prison admissions and sentencing
lengths. He finds that Republican district attorneys incarcerate people at 18-21
percent higher rates and for 10 percent longer terms. I model my regression after
his panel design. He controls for population, income, and nonwhite share of the
population, but not for county-level conservatism, a possible confounding variable
which I will explain later. Significantly, Krumholz collected the data on district
attorneys which I utilize in this paper. His study, along with Arora (2018), which
I discuss below, are the only two studies into the effects of DA partisanship on any
criminal justice outcome. Since they both find significant results they motivate my
study to look into what effects DA partisanship has on other outcomes.
Arora (2018) employs a regression discontinuity design where the running variable
is Republican vote share in the district attorney election and the cutoff is 50 per-
cent. This ultimately tests competitive counties in which a Republican won against
competitive ones in which they did not. Krumholz considered using this design in
his paper but decided against it for lack of power due to there being so few compet-
itive races. Arora’s findings with this design show that local district attorneys do
not make a difference in the number of people incarcerated, but they do play a role
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in the length of incarceration, which can consequently drive up total numbers. She
makes a brief point that jail populations rise under Republican DAs while they are
in office, but mentions this mostly to highlight that the overall rise in prison incar-
ceration under Republicans is mostly attributable to increases in prison sentencing
length. Significantly, she also finds that these changes are in no way correlated with
the crime rate.
The third important set of studies are Durante (2020), Percival (2010), and Cum-
ley (2012). Durante (2020) studies racial and ethnic data for prison admissions to
evaluate various theorized causes of cross-racial disparities including racial/ethnic
threat1, inequality, and political climate using OLS. Most importantly for my pur-
poses, she finds that there is a negative relation between county-level conservatism,
measured by percentage of Republican voters, and disparity in white and nonwhite
sentencing rates. Percival (2010) also evaluates racial threat theory on a set of coun-
ties in California and tests county-level conservatism as an independent variable
using OLS. He finds it is a strong predictor of Black and Latino incarceration rates.
Percival estimates county-level conservatism by creating an index from questions
asked in California Field Poll surveys. Finally, Cumley (2012) studies the effect of
local economies and political contexts on incarceration rates using a first difference
regression model. She measures county-level conservatism via percentage vote share
for the Republican in the most recent presidential election. These three empirical
studies, each testing various theoretical sociological models, all find clear effects of
1The racial and ethnic threat hypotheses predict that as the population of a minority group
rises in a certain area, the dominant race will feel threatened and enact stronger social controls
on the minority. In this case, they would predict that white DAs and voters will incarcerate more
minorities as their population rises.
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county-level conservatism on incarceration. Since we would expect county-level con-
servatism to correlate with whether a Republican DA is elected, Krumholz and Arora
may both be capturing the effects of conservatism along with any effects of the in-
dividual district attorney, so long as conservatism is time-varying2. This concern is
why I sought to replicate their results on prison admissions when controlling for this
variable, which has been proven to be significant in the literature.
Finally, a pair of studies, Carmichael (2005) and Smith (2004) assess various
claims from political theory via regression to see which factors explain jail and prison
admissions, respectively. They both reject the traditional explanation of admissions
rates following from crime rates. Instead, they find that the percentage of the pop-
ulation that is Black and Latino plays a large role, mixed effects about economic
inequality, and that partisanship on a state level plays a role. They also find strong
regional effects. These results suggest control variables we should adopt. Since I plan
on using a fixed-effects model, some of their important variables should be captured
without needing to account for them explicitly. For example, the county fixed-effect
should take care of any regional effects since a county’s being in the South will not
change with time. However, variables such as percent Black or Latino could shift
quickly over time so I account for these as a control variable.
Finally, this paper contributes to a broader developing field in economics and po-
litical science which considers the degree to which local actors have influence over the
outcomes in their regions (Travis et al., 2014; Thompson, 2020; Ferreira and Gyourko,
2009). For example, Thompson (2020) studies the effect of local law enforcement’s
2Seeing as some states and counties regularly change partisanship, it seems likely that conser-
vatism shifts over time
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partisanship to see whether they cooperate with immigration authorities at different
rates, and finds they do not. The DA is one such local actor with apparent sway
over the criminal justice outcomes in their jurisdiction.
3 Background
3.1 District Attorneys
District Attorneys are the head government prosecutor for a county. In some smaller
population counties, the DA is a part-time position that only prosecutes the occa-
sional case, while in bigger ones they may employ a large staff and rarely prosecute
themselves. DAs may also be called state’s attorneys or commonwealth attorneys.
They are typically chosen in partisan elections, though some states3 use appointment
or non-partisan election4. This paper only looks at DAs chosen through partisan
elections. DAs typically have immense sway in their decisions over which crimes to
prosecute and which plea bargains are made.
Since Democrats and Republicans have different standpoints on what ideal crimi-
nal justice outcomes would look like (Associates, 2007), we would expect that a DA’s
partisanship would influence their personal preferences over policy. I use a DA’s par-
tisanship as a rough measure of their policy preferences, and use the partisanship of
their county to indicate the electorate’s preferences. If both the county and the DA
3Alaska, Connecticut, and New Jersey appoint their DAs. Rhode Island and Delaware do not
have DAs, instead, a state-wide office handles all prosecution. In Hawaii, California, Oregon, North
Dakota, and Minnesota, DAs are elected in non-partisan elections.
4The states which are not in the sample do not seem to have any particularly important com-
monalities. They are somewhat clustered in the Northeast and tend to vote Democratic but this is
not a particularly strong cause for concern.
7
have strong Republican preferences, how can we distinguish one policy preference
from the other? It is a well-known phenomenon that partisans in power are much
more heavily polarized than partisans in the electorate; this means that politicians
typically have much more radical viewpoints than their voters (Hertel-Fernandez
et al., 2019; Broockman and Skovron, 2018). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that a
partisan holding the office of DA has more radical views in the direction of their party
than their voters do, so we can take their partisanship as a measure of preferences
without confusion.
3.2 Jails
Jails typically hold people who are waiting for their trial but cannot make bail or
were denied bail until their court date. In contrast, prisons hold people after they
have been tried and found guilty. Several prison reform organizations such as the
Vera Institute or the Prison Policy Institute identify jails as key entry points into
the criminal justice system, and argue that growth in jail populations are part of the
equation to mass incarceration, and have negative impacts of their own (Subramanian
et al., 2015). For example, the ACLU describes a cycle characterized by the accrual
of criminal justice debt which some inmates cannot pay off in time, resulting in their
temporary jailing for failure to pay, oftentimes resulting in the accrual of more debt
(Alexander et al., 2010). This is especially concerning since most people are given
the option to pay bail, and thus most people in jail are there because they were too
poor to make it. Krauth et al. (2005) surveyed 224 jails and found the total revenue
they made from inmate fees to be over $20 million. This kind of cycle is detrimental
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to both the inmates and the local economy, providing an example of why studying
jails is interesting.
4 Theoretical Model
Because DA partisanship is only a rough approximation of DA preferences, I create
a theoretical model to help interpret results and lay more substantive causal claims.
This model is based on median voter theory but adds some extensions in the interest
of realism.
4.1 Median Voter Theory
The median voter theory essentially predicts that politicians’ stances will converge
to that of the median voter (Hotelling, 1929). The model that produces this result is
predicated on the assumptions that voter preferences can be collapsed into a single
axis, and that voters will vote for whichever politician’s platform is closest to them
on that axis. This way, whichever politician’s platform is closest to the median voter
will necessarily win the race and they are thus incentivized to place their policies at
the median voter’s preferences, otherwise, the other candidate can win the election
by moving closer. In this model, the single axis will be the number of yearly jailings
j. Each voter i has a preference ji which they think is ideal, and the median voter
ī has preference jī. For our purposes, we estimate the preferences of the median
voter with the degree of conservatism in the county. We would then expect that a
DA candidate would place their policies ĵ at exactly jī to guarantee election, and
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thus DA partisanship would have no predictive power as they would simply enact
precisely the will of the people. According to the model, two counties with the same
conservatism, and thus the same preferences, where one DA is a Democrat and the
other is a Republican, would have the exact same number of jailings. The party of
the DA is beside the point, they win elections because they enact popular policy.
This acts as the groundwork, but in order to allow the DAs some room within which
to create policy not precisely defined by the median voter, I consider some ways we
can extend the theory.
4.2 Extensions
Lack of information: Especially in the case of local elections, information on
candidates can be slim and voters must go to lengths to find it if it is present. This
means that voters do not observe precisely the preferences of a candidate but only a
fuzzy approximation. This could cause voters to vote for one candidate when they
should have voted for the other and allows the candidates more room in which to set
ĵ while still being elected.
Heuristics: Furthermore, many voters do not bother to learn about candidate
positions whatsoever and simply use political parties as heuristics to help decide
their vote choice. This means the candidate is theoretically free to set ĵ anywhere
so long as their party holds the majority of voters in their district and they do not
become so radical as to draw attention to their deviancy from the party line.
Lack of competition: In many DA races, especially in smaller counties, the
election is unopposed and thus the one candidate can choose ĵ anywhere on the
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spectrum so long as it is not so radical as to cause someone else to run. Similarly,
if the candidate has a strong majority and a competitor who is unwilling to move
their positions in the direction of the median voter, they do not have to stay at the
position of the median voter.
Multidimensional voters: It is likely that voters care about more than one
issue when deciding their vote for DA. This leaves the possibility that even a perfectly
informed voter with several choices will consistently choose a candidate who lays jail
admissions policy further from ji than their opposition, since they believe another
issue is more important. I do not model this possibility rigorously but it serves to
explain further how DAs might fall out of line with their constituents.
Taken together, these extensions create a voter blind spot in which some voters
can not distinguish between candidates or make the “correct” voting decision with
respect to jailings, which means candidate opinions do not necessarily have to con-
verge exactly to the median voter. This leaves the candidates with some space to
create policy that is not precisely at the median voter’s preferences. Note also that
the first three of these extensions are more likely to arise in low-population districts.
Many DA races in rural counties are uncontested, and when they are, information
is difficult for voters to come across because of lower advertising budgets and lack
of newspapers, which encourages the use of heuristics when voting. The final issue
of multidimensional voters should not be particularly more or less prevalent in rural
or urban counties, and I expect the other effects would dominate even if it did, I
simply include it to point out another way voter blind spot could be created. If the
extensions hold, there are various uses for this newfound flexibility.
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4.3 Career Concern and DA Preferences
There is economic research behind the idea that laborers and politicians may behave
differently than may be optimal in the moment because of an expectation that it
will improve their career in the future (SHIH et al., 2012; Dewatripont et al., 1999).
We can apply a similar logic here. If the DA has ambitions beyond being re-elected
DA and their county is not representative of the state at large (say, for example,
a rural red county in a mostly blue state), they may want to deviate from their
county’s median voter to go more in the direction of their state’s median voter. This
way, when their record is inspected later on in a different race, they may appear less
out-of-line with the state’s preferences and thus succeed in capturing more of the
vote.
A second possibility is the simple observation that DAs may not be perfectly
political actors and in fact have preferences over jailings themselves. They may have
a personal jDA which believe their county is better off with and will gain utility by
setting ĵ closer to jDA than jī so long as they still get elected. This would be in line
with the group center theory of parties which relies on a similar voter blind spot to
what I outlined above to give parties room to have preferences (Bawn et al., 2012).
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4.4 The Model
4.4.1 Adequate Voter Information
We take the perspective of the incumbent Democratic5 DA, D, facing re-election
against a Republican challenger R. The incumbent is tasked with creating policy
j, and they have a personal preference believing that policy should be set at jD,
they will get more utility if the policy that is created, whether they make it or the
challenger, is closer to their preference. Finally, both candidates know the median
voter’s preferences V will be distributed according to some known distribution, so
V ∼ fV .
Because the challenger R has no record as DA to look at and campaign messages
are unclear and cheap talk, both incumbent D and the voters can only infer that
the challenger’s policy will be distributed according to some known distribution of
policies from the other party, so R ∼ fR, and they must work with E[R] = µR.
Let us assume than the incumbent’s personal preference is bounded by those of the
expected Republican, that is, jD < µR, since otherwise the incumbent would be best
off switching parties and running as a Republican. Logically, this will also mean that
the incumbent creates policy such that j < µR, because they do not know the exact
policy preferred by their challenger R so it will never make sense to place policy to
the right of what they expect it to be, at that point they would be better off losing
the race. Further, note that there are upper and lower bounds to what policy j can
be, namely, jailing 0% of the population or 100%, so we can assume all distributions
5We can easily come from the perspective of an incumbent Republican by flipping a few in-
equalities and changing some variable names, so this model is general.
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are bounded by 0 and 1.
First, the incumbent must work out what their probability of winning is given a
value of j that they set.
Pr (Win|j) = Pr((j − V )2 < (µR − V )2)
= Pr(j2 − 2jV − µ2R + 2µR · V < 0)





This is simply the cumulative distribution function of median voter preferences
V evaluated at the average between the expected policy µR of the challenger R and
the policy j of the incumbent D. Thus,
Pr (Win|j) = FV (µR+j2 )
with FV the cumulative distribution function of V . With this calculation out of
the way we can now set up the equation for the incumbent’s utility. They suffer a
loss when the policy that is created is different from their preferred policy jD. Thus,
they can lose utility even when they win, because they may have set j 6= jD to do
so. So, the incumbent is choosing policy j both in order to alter their probability of
winning, and to decrease the distance between reality and their preferences. They
also must account for the challenger’s possible policies, any time they decrease their
probability of winning, they increase the likelihood of the challenger getting to create
policy. They do not know exactly where the challenger will lay policy, though, they
only have the expectation given the distribution of Republicans. So, the incumbent
has choice variable j and attempts to maximize their utility:
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U = −Pr (Win|j) · (jD − j)2 − (1− Pr (Win|j))E[(jD −R)2]
= −Pr (Win|j) · (jD − j)2 − (1− Pr (Win|j))(j2D − 2jDµR + E[R2])
= −Pr (Win|j) · (jD − j)2 − (1− Pr (Win|j))(j2D − 2jDµR + σ2R + µ2R)
= −Pr (Win|j) · (jD − j)2 − (1− Pr (Win|j))((jD − µR)2 + σ2R).
Note that this model is representative of those cases wherein there is competition,
and voters are well-informed of the policy j the incumbent has created, thus this is
the model most likely to be reflective of nonrural areas, as argued in section 4.2.
4.4.2 Example: Uniformly Distributed Median Voter
To go any further with this model we will need to make assumptions about the
preferences of the median voter V . Realistically, fV would be highly dependent on
the county we are in. For this example, say V is distributed uniformly between 0
and 1. Then we have
Pr (Win|j) = µR+j
2
and thus incumbent D chooses policy j to maximize their utility
U = −µR + j
2
· (jD − j)2 − (1−
µR + j
2
)((jD − µR)2 + σ2R).
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This will result in first order conditions:
FOCj = 0 = σ
2
R − 3j2 − 2jµR + µ2R + 4jDj




(2jD − µR ±
√
4j2D − 4jDµR + 4µ2R + 3σ2R).
Note that the square root term is always positive so long as 0 ≤ jD ≤ 1 and
0 ≤ µR ≤ 1, both of which are required by assumption. Using computer analysis we
can determine that the minus solution is the local minimum while the plus solution
is the local maximum. We still have to check for corner solutions, but we should keep
in mind that only one corner needs to be checked, due to the argument we made
earlier showing that j < µR, and thus we need only check when j = 0. Numerical
analysis reveals that, regardless of the distribution of R and the value of jD, the
incumbent is always better off choosing the local maximum, not the corner. This
means that, for this distribution of voters, there will never be a corner solution.
In that case, it is interesting to see how the incumbent’s strategy changes based

























4j2D − 4jDµR + 4µ2R + 3σ2R.
So, it is easy to see that an increase in the incumbent’s preferences jD will lead to
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an increase in their policy j, and the same effect occurs for σ2R = Var(R). This makes
sense, the incumbent should always choose to place policy closer to their preferences,
and the more unpredictable the opponent’s policy outcomes are, the smarter it is
to prevent them from winning by setting policy closer to what they are expected to
do. However, the middle solution has some nuance, it is possible for it to be both
positive and negative. Figure 1 shows the regions where policy j will increase along
with E[R] = µR when σ
2
R = .1 and σ
2
R = .5. We can see that, when there are high
expectations of the challenger’s policy, it makes sense to sacrifice some distance from
personal preference to prevent them from winning, but if challenger expectations
are low enough, it is better to decrease policy to get more in line with personal
preferences. We also see that the higher the variance, the smaller the region in which
the incumbent is willing to increase j, likely because they recognize that there is an
upper bound to jailings and thus the higher variance can only push policy downward.
We should remember also that we assumed that jD < µR, so only scenarios in the
top left triangle of these plots should be considered.
4.4.3 Lack of Voter Information: Heuristics
In this model, voters using heuristics would replace actual policy j with expected
policy E[D], so then Pr (Win) = FV (
E[D]+µR
2
) is a fixed value that does not depend
on j. This means the incumbent’s actual policies do not play any role in whether
they win, thus they have no reason to not simply set policy at their preference, so
j = jD. We can see this easily in the math as well, the incumbent will have:
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Figure 1: The Effect of E[R] on j
FOCj = 0 = Pr (Win) · (−2jD + 2j)
Pr (Win) · 2jD = Pr (Win) · 2j
j = jD.
Note that this model is likely the most representative of rural counties in which
poor information will lead to voters using heuristics as the best alternative to well-
informed vote choice. We can see that under the adequate information model, policy
was being set closer to the expected median voter preference E[V ], while in this one
it is set at the DA’s preferences jD.
4.4.4 Lack of Voter Information: Poor Estimate
It is possible that voters would continue to refuse to use heuristics even when faced
with a lack of information. In this case, voters would operate with some fuzzy
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approximation of policy j, so Pr (Win) = Pr(V < µR+j+ε
2
) with ε randomly drawn
from some distribution with E[ε] = 0. Since the DA does not know the value of ε,
they must operate using its expected value, in which case they will choose j the same
way they would under perfect information. This decision will be inefficient since the
real probabilities of winning and losing would be shifted.
4.4.5 Lack of Competition
If no one runs against the incumbent, we would have Pr (Win) = 1 so value is
maximized at j = jD via the same calculations above. This is also a likely scenario
in rural counties.
4.4.6 Combining the Models
While I have introduced all of these models as separate, they can really be thought of
as possible results of shocks in one larger model. That is to say, we can imagine that
there is some probability of a shock occurring which causes an opponent to run. If
that occurs, we can introduce an aggregate shock that, with some probability, would
cause all voters to have adequate or inadequate information. One could interpret this
shock as a local newspaper running a story about the DA race with candidates not
knowing if people will read it. The incumbent would know whether the first shock
has occurred, and if it has not, they quickly set j = jD, but if it has, they are now
faced with the problem of maximizing utility with choice variable j with probability
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of the second shock occurring being ρ:
U = ρ · (−Pr (Win|j) · (jD − j)2 − (1− Pr (Win|j))((jD − µR)2 + σ2R)) + (1− ρ) · (j − jD)2.
We can now see if ρ = 1, we simply enter the adequate information model, and if
ρ = 0, we enter the heuristics model. For any value in between, the incumbent will
have to weigh between the two to choose one j which optimizes the weighted utility
of both.
4.5 Relation to the Empirical Model
We use DA partisanship as an indication of jDA, the preferences of the DA. We use
average Republican vote share to be indicative of jī, this is imperfect since means are
not medians, so we will underestimate the effects of conservatism and overestimate
the effects of the DA for counties with highly skewed voting bases. This will occur
because we will take jī to be more moderate than it really is, since means are always
closer to the skewed end of a distribution than the means are. With that in mind, by
regressing DA partisanship at the same time as county conservatism, we can observe
the effects of the electorate’s preferences as separate from the effect of the DA’s
personal preferences. This will give a sense of how much of the DA’s impact is due
to their personal preferences versus them enacting the will of the people. Further,
since we expect the effect of the DA’s personal preferences to be higher in rural areas
since the extensions are more common there, we should be able to see a reduction in
effect when excluding them.
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5 Data
I use four sources of data. First, there is Krumholz’s set of county-level results for
district attorney elections. I clean the set by removing data from primary elections
since the winners of those do not necessarily hold office. Then, I keep all observations
of a candidate in an uncontested election since they must win by default, and keep
all candidates with the most votes in a contested election, since they should win by
electoral plurality. I then fill in the gaps between elections by assuming whoever won
the last election will hold office until the next one. This may mean there are some
erroneous years in which a DA dies or quits and is replaced by someone else, but these
cases should be a vast minority and even then likely not affect partisanship of who
holds the office. This gives me 38,675 observations of partisan control by county6 by
year spanning from 1993 to 2019, with more observations in more recent years due
to the availability of election data. There is a roughly even split of Republicans and
Democrats, so we need not be worried about the data set being skewed to one side.
Second, I use the Vera Institute’s incarceration trends dataset which contains
longitudinal data on jail and prison population, as well as basic county information
for every county between 1970 and 2018 (Vera, 2018). They draw their data from
the National Corrections Reporting Program, Deaths in Custody Reporting Pro-
gram, Annual Survey of Jails, Census of Jails, Census of State and Federal Adult
Correctional Facilities, FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Program, Centers for Disease
Control, Department of Agriculture, and the Census Bureau. The key variables here
are total jail admissions rate and total prison admissions rate, though I also get year
6These are counties as defined by Federal Information Processing Standards codes (FIPS codes)
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over year racial breakdowns from this set. It is important to note that they calculate
the admissions rate per 100,000 residents between the age of 15-64. I will follow the
Vera Institute in the choice to exclude people under 15 and over 64 because those
populations have a very low chance of being jailed or incarcerated, but at the same
time their proportion of the total population varies wildly by county. Thus, including
them would skew cross-county comparisons towards lower results for counties with
large populations that are not susceptible to being jailed or incarcerated in the first
place. I also adopt the variables for urbanicity7, commuting zone, and Black/Latino
share of the population (also between 15 and 64) from this set.
Third, I use MIT’s county presidential election returns covering every county
between 2000 and 2016 (Data and Lab, 2018). Here the variable of interest is fraction
of votes cast in favor of whoever the Republican running was. I use this as a rough
measure of county-level conservatism, following Durante (2020), Cumley (2012), and
others. There is cause for concern over multicollinearity between this and district
attorney partisanship. After all, most voters vote for one party down the ballot. The
point-biserial correlation between conservatism and whether or not a Republican DA
is elected is .34 with t = 50.431. However, the variance inflation factor for each of
the variables (other than the county dummies) in the regressions is less than 2, so
perhaps it is less concerning than we might expect.
Finally, I use Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE) data sets from
2000-2018 for the variables of county-level annual median income and poverty rate
(Income and Estimates, 2018).
7Urbanicity will not be of use in the actual regression as the fixed-effects model will account
for it, but I will use it to split the sample and see separate effects for rural and non-rural counties
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Before excluding outliers we have 27,186 observations of year, county, DA party,
conservatism, county population between 15 and 64, Black and Latino share of pop-
ulation, median income, poverty rate, and jail admissions rate between 2000 and
2018. Similarly, we have 29,541 observations of all the above variables but substitut-
ing prison admissions rate for jail admissions rate.
I exclude any observations for which the jail admissions rate is higher than 20
per 100 people (1379 observations, about 4 percent of the jail data) and for which
the prison admissions rate is higher than 1 per 100 people (556 observations, about 2
percent of the prison data). These observations are outliers, typically from very low-
population counties, and significantly skew the regression without providing much
insight. Further, I exclude observations in which an independent has won, since
independents will not consistently have preferences to the left or right, so they do
not fit well into my theoretical model. This means we have no observations from
those states which elect DAs in non-partisan elections. I do not follow Krumholz
in excluding all counties with a low population because it has been found that the
primary contributor to the growth of jails nationwide is rural counties, not urban, so
we do not want to exclude these low-population counties from our analysis (Kang-
Brown and Subramanian, 2017). The downside of this is the higher year-to-year
fluctuation in admissions rates in such counties, I provide robustness checks in the
results section either way. Ultimately my data set for prison admissions has 26,630
observations, 15,900 when excluding low-population counties, and the jail data has
28,162 observations, 17,303 when excluding low-population counties.
Ultimately, when comparing to the original, raw data, I have excluded any ob-
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servations from before 2000, since there is no SAIPE data available for that time,
excluded large outliers from relatively few, almost all rural counties, and removed any
observations where an Independent holds office, which almost all come from states
with non-partisan elections. This does not concern me much because, as I mentioned
before, there are no strong commonalities between the states which are excluded, so
we should still be able to generalize. Further, although we have disproportionately
cut away rural counties, there are still plenty remaining as we see below in Table 4.
5.1 Summary Statistics
In Table 1 we can see summary statistics for numeric variables in the complete data
set. It is important to note that the prison admissions rate is a percent, so the
maximum being 1 means at most 1 out of 100 people are incarcerated, not 100%
of the county in incarcerated. This is reflective of how rare of an outcome prison
incarceration is. The mean jail admissions rate is higher, as is to be expected,
since many more people are put in jail than are ultimately incarcerated. Note that
the variables starting with a % are out of 1. It is interesting to point out that mean
conservatism is .589, this may be confusing since this would constitute an unbreakable
Republican majority, and yet we know Democrats regularly win national elections.
This is because these values are not population-weighted, so we count one 90%
Republican county in Wyoming as equal to the majority-Democrat Kings County,
which houses all of Brooklyn. Since more low-population counties are Republican,
we get this unintuitive statistic. In Tables 2 and 3 I show summary statistics for
the jail and prison data split from the full data, as we can see there are no large
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differences, spare a small increase in the population variable. This is because lower-
population counties were somewhat more likely to have data unavailable on jail or
prison admissions.
Table 1: Numeric Summary Statistics for Full Data
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Prison Adm Rate / 100 26,630 0.333 0.197 0.000 1
Jail Adm Rate / 100 28,162 7.476 4.019 0.000 19.987
Year 31,782 2,009.030 4.979 2,000 2,018
Population 15-64 31,782 69,069.650 187,615.900 43 5,806,431
Median Income 31,782 42,752.940 12,183.280 16,435 140,382
% Conservatism 31,782 0.589 0.140 0.084 0.959
% Poverty 31,782 0.163 0.066 0.017 0.530
% Nonwhite 31,782 0.236 0.204 0.007 0.979
% Black 31,782 0.117 0.163 0.000 0.880
% Latino 31,782 0.094 0.146 0.002 0.974
Table 2: Numeric Summary Statistics for Jail Data
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Jail Adm Rate / 100 28,162 7.476 4.019 0.000 19.987
Year 28,162 2,009.013 4.983 2,000 2,018
Population 15-64 28,162 75,559.650 197,764.300 189 5,806,431
Median Income 28,162 43,252.670 12,318.580 16,435 140,382
% Conservatism 28,162 0.587 0.137 0.084 0.946
% Poverty 28,162 0.161 0.064 0.017 0.530
% Nonwhite 28,162 0.231 0.198 0.007 0.979
% Black 28,162 0.117 0.160 0.000 0.880
% Latino 28,162 0.089 0.137 0.002 0.974
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Table 3: Numeric Summary Statistics for Prison Data
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Prison Adm Rate / 100 26,630 0.333 0.197 0.000 1.000
Year 26,630 2,008.518 4.626 2,000 2,016
Population 15-64 26,630 72,961.650 196,091.600 43 5,806,431
Median Income 26,630 42,150.710 11,522.420 17,201 119,525
% Conservatism 26,630 0.585 0.135 0.092 0.959
% Poverty 26,630 0.165 0.066 0.017 0.530
% Nonwhite 26,630 0.237 0.202 0.007 0.979
% Black 26,630 0.126 0.166 0.000 0.878
% Latino 26,630 0.089 0.142 0.002 0.974
In Table 4, I cross-tabulate partisan control with urbanicity, likely the biggest
surprise here is how roughly even the splits are. Across the board, Democrats and
Republicans are within 3% of each other at every level of urbanicity, though Republi-
cans slightly over-perform that in the suburbs. This may come as a surprise, since we
might expect Republicans to dominate rural areas. This apparent discrepancy likely
results from two phenomena: first, rural areas are not the Republican monoliths we
usually expect them to be, especially not before 2008, and second, the data set may
be slightly biased. Krumholz (2019) talks about the difficulty of aggregating rural
DA data in his paper, and explains that states with poor statewide election reporting
are underrepresented in the set. However, we have no strong reason to believe that
Republican DAs in counties we do have data for would behave differently than those
we don’t, which means the even split in the data we have will actually benefit our
regression.
Figure 2 shows histograms for year and log population. Note that data becomes
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more and more available over time as online reporting gets better until 2017 and 2018
which is when most of the data was gathered and thus some is missing. We can also
see that log population follows a roughly normal distribution which is comforting as
it shows proper sampling from the population.
Table 4: Cross-Tabulating Urbanicity with DA Partisanship
Rural Small/Mid Suburban Urban Totals
Democrat 9684 4108 1580 432 15804
(30.5%) (12.9%) (5%) (1.4%) (49.7%)
Republican 9004 4134 2597 243 15978
(28.3%) (13.0%) (8.2%) (.8%) 50.3%
Totals 18688 8242 4177 675 31782
(58.8%) (25.9%) (13.1%) (2.1%) (100%)
5.2 Graphical Intuition with the Effects of Conservatism
One should be cautious when using 2-dimensional graphics to show trends in such
a multi-dimensional dataset, as they can be misleading. There may appear to be
a positive relationship between two variables, but that may disappear in a proper
regression when controlling for a third variable. For example, we can see in Figure
3 below that there appear to be positive relationships between conservatism and
the admissions rates, both jail and prison. It is possible that this apparent trend is
simply caused by a confounding variable, perhaps population size, which correlates
positively with both. However, this trend remains when running our regression with
its many controls, so the graphical intuition holds up.
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Figure 2: Data Availability by Year and Population Frequency
Figure 3: Admissions Rates by Conservatism
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6 Empirical Model
In this paper, I am attempting to find a causal link between district attorney political
affiliation and the jail admissions rate, as well as check whether prior findings hold
when accounting for county-level conservatism. To that end, I will precisely define
the jail admissions rate as the total number of people in a county admitted to jail
each year divided by the population of that county aged between 15 and 64. As
explained in the data section, people outside of this group are very unlikely to get
jailed or incarcerated and thus it makes sense to only weigh by population susceptible
to this outcome.
We cannot run a simple OLS regression, even with several control variables,
because there are so many county-level factors that could have an impact, it is
impossible to know them all, much less control for them. Something as arbitrary as
the location of public parks may affect jail admissions rates since homeless people
may tend to hang around parks, and if they are in heavily-patrolled areas more
homeless people would be booked for loitering. Nearly any aspect of a town could
be reasonably expected to affect jail admissions rates. Further, many such factors
would be very difficult to measure, such as local laws or organized crime as previously
mentioned. Thus, we must move towards a model that accounts for county-level
effects in its structure such as the regression discontinuity design as Arora (2018)
uses. Unfortunately, we would be underpowered to do this and draw relevant results.
More than 3 in 4 of the elections in our dataset are uncontested, and only around
400 data points fall within the bandwidth to be included for a minimum detectable
effect (Krumholz, 2019). Thus, I elect not to use a regression discontinuity design.
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Instead, I use a fixed-effects model to better control for county-level effects. This
allows us to control for several time-varying and time-invariant effects while still
being able to utilize most of the dataset. The requirements are that the error term
εct has conditional mean zero, which will be imposed by construction, as well as the
variables having no perfect multicollinearity with other variables, no large outliers,
and proper selection. I believe these are all satisfied after the data cleaning. Thus,
I specifically estimate
Yct = β0 + β1Rct + βc ·αc + β ·Zct + εct. (M1)
Here, Yct is the outcome variable: the jail admissions rate in a given county c in a
given year t. Further, Rct is a binary variable coded 0 if the DA in county c in year t
is a Democrat, 1 if a Republican. Next, βc ·αc is a vector dot product of county fixed
effects and their coefficients, so each coefficient captures the time-invariant effects of
being in a given county c. Finally, β · Zct is a vector dot product of time-varying
county by year control variables and their coefficients. These county by year controls
are Latino and Black shares of the population, log population between 15 and 64,
log median income8, poverty rate, and county-level conservatism.
This model is effective at capturing all time-invariant effects of a county, but
only controls for time-varying observables. While β · Zct captures some, there are
many time-varying unobservables that could be driving the relationship, such as
national crime rates changing in response to a recession or a pandemic. Thus, we
8I show robustness on all results without the logs, but they improve the heteroscedasticity of
the residuals
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move forward with another specification, we now estimate
Yct = β0 + β1Rct + βc ·αc + β ·Zct + βt · Tt + εct. (M2)
Here, Tt is a vector containing dummies for each of the years in the data set (2000
through 2018), and βt is the vector of corresponding coefficients for each year. Thus,
each coefficient βt captures the county-invariant effects of being in year t. This allows
us to account for annual effects on the national level affecting jail and prison admis-
sions rates, but what about county-level effects? We can easily imagine something
like the opioid epidemic having very strong effects on certain counties while barely
affecting others, even within the same state. In order to account for such changes,
we introduce another new term when we estimate
Yct = β0 + β1Rct + βc ·αc + β ·Zct + βt · Tt + β̃c ·αc · At + εct. (M3)
This new term is multiplying the continuous year variable At into each of county
effects. Thus, β̃c is only indexed by c because there are only so many coefficients
as there are counties. Each coefficient β̃c in the vector is the corresponding change
in Yct given one year passing in county c. This is somewhat problematic because
it only allows for one-dimensional change in county time-variant effects. That is, if
the coefficient is positive, one year passing will always mean an expected increase
in admissions, even if that year the time-varying effects actually decreased them, in
contradiction to the larger increasing trend. Ideally, we would be able to fix this
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by interacting αc and Tt, but then we would have a dummy per observation, which
would violate the regression assumptions of having no perfect multicollinearity.
So how to better account for time-varying county-level factors? I propose using
commuting zones. Commuting zones are government-created geographic boundaries
within which economic, demographic, and population trends are typically quite ho-
mogeneous. Each commuting zone typically contains 3 or 4 counties, and while there
are exceptions, they do not typically cross state boundaries. Thus, controlling for
commuting zones over time will allow us to capture time-varying economic, demo-
graphic, and even many political effects. We could control for commuting zone per
year, but we will be able to draw more variation out of the data if we use a larger
time frame. I recommend using commuting zone by four years, aligning the years
with election years (so 2000 to 2004, 2004 to 2008, and so on). This way we cap-
ture effects of state-level government changes. Doing this allows us to drop the year
dummies9 and the county time trends since their effects should now be captured by
the commuting zone by four years dummies, so we now estimate
Yczt = β0 + β1Rczt + βc ·αc + βz4t · τz4t + β ·Zczt + εczt. (M4)
Now τz4t is the vector containing every commuting zone by four years dummy.
Since commuting zone varies by county and vice-versa, the subscripts here can be-
come somewhat confusing and arbitrary, so I have chosen the ones that seem most
conducive to understanding. For example, αc is a county dummy whose correspond-
ing coefficient might capture the time-invariant effects of being in Autauga county,
9In Table 18 in the appendix I show robustness when including these.
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which is always in Commuting Zone 60. The variable τz4t is a commuting zone by
4 years dummy whose coefficient captures any effects of being in the zone within a
4 year span, so it might affect every county in Commuting Zone 6010 between the
years of 2000 and 2004.
This model will control for several key county-level factors that vary over time,
county-level factors that do not vary, as well as commuting-zone level factors that
vary over time. Still, there may be some county-level time-varying factors we cannot
account for: county-level social programs or changes in the leadership of police forces
to be more forgiving or more draconian would likely impact our outcome variable
but are nearly impossible to quantify. Another concern might be that rising fears
about crime would cause more election of “tough-on-crime” candidates (likely Re-
publicans) and thus bias the coefficient upwards. Furthermore, our primary avenue
of influence for DA partisanship on jail admissions is in the hypothesis that party
affiliation reflects ideology which will affect their behavior in office. While we know
that this mechanism works, partisanship is not a perfect measure of ideology (As-
sociates, 2007). There will be large variance within parties in opinions on criminal
justice to the degree that we would expect some Democrats to agree more with some
Republicans than with other Democrats and vice versa. Ultimately I would expect
our calculated bias to be slightly higher because it seems that most of the unobserved
time-varying factors would correlate positively with higher admissions rates and also
correlate with Republican election, thus biasing us upward.
10These counties are Autauga, Butler, Covington, Crenshaw, Elmore, Lowndes, Montgomery,




Table 5 shows the results of running each of the different models outlined above on
the jail data. They are mostly robust to each other, especially in the key variables of
partisanship and conservatism, with the exception of the third model. Its coefficients
for nearly every variable, especially percent Latino, are significantly different from
the coefficients for every other model, this may imply the existence of some county
time-varying effect which correlates with Republican election and jail admissions
rates, affecting coefficient estimates. Interestingly, when running this same model
but simply replacing counties with commuting zones, we show robustness to the other
3, as shown in Table 13 in the appendix, so there must be something county-specific
causing this trend.
Table 6 shows the same models regressed on prison admissions instead. Here the
results are mostly robust across all models, especially in the most important variables.
The biggest difference is still in model 3 which reduces the effect of conservatism,
though it is still highly significant, raises the constant, and causes irregular shifts in
the demographic statistics.
There are several possible explanations for this change in results when accounting
for a county time trend. One possibility is that we are simply stretching the model
too thin: each county has at most 18 observations and this model allows for two
variables per county to explain that small level of variance, which leaves all the other
coefficients to fill in the gaps. It is worth pointing out that the BIC prefers models 1
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and 211, both of which show robustness with model 4. However, running an F-test12
on the joint significance of the county time trends introduced in model 3 compared
to model 2 which does not include them gives an F statistic of 6.76 and probability
of joint insignificance of the time trends being near 0. Thus, we should not rule this
model out entirely.
A second possibility is that this is misspecification. As I pointed out in the model
section, this approach to the time-varying factors forces one-dimensional change
within a county over time. I think it is much more realistic to use time as a categor-
ical variable rather than a continuous one in this case, since the time-varying effects
would not necessarily trend in one direction. I believe that this could cause both
changed standard errors and changed coefficient estimates that may not reflect the
nature of the data.
The last, most concerning possibility, is that model 3 is capturing a real effect
which failing to account for would bias our coefficients. Since we do not have this issue
when accounting for commuting zone time effects, it must be something specific to
the county. Since commuting zones should mostly reflect demographic and economic
changes of the counties within them, I would suspect this would be an effect of
local government. One possibility is that the DA alters their behavior depending
on where they are in the election cycle. Perhaps the year before election, DAs alter
policy to be more in line with the peoples’ preferences, so voters judging their record
do so more kindly. Another possibility is that we are capturing some kind of effect
11Model 2 has BIC 133554.8 while model 3 has 141764.0
12It is worth noting that this F-test is different from the one given in all my regression tables,
which tests the joint significance of all controls and rejects the intercept-only model.
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relating to percent Latino. Perhaps as more Latinos come into a county over time this
affects both the admissions rate and who gets elected. I test the first hypothesis by
controlling for years since the last election and the second by controlling for percent
change in Latino population, both variables’ coefficients have no significance and
their inclusion does not affect the other coefficients in the model at all, these tables
are available in Table 15 in the appendix. I also try running model 3 when splitting
the data into urban and rural counties and find that coefficients for percent Black,
percent Latino, and the constants vary wildly between regressions, which makes me
suspicious that this is simply misspecification, this is Table 14 in the appendix. I
move forward with my preferred model, model 4.
7.2 Conservatism and Partisanship
I find that in both the cases of jails and prisons, county conservatism is a highly
significant predictor of admissions rates. Specifically, a 1 percent increase in conser-
vatism results in an increase of .05 admissions per 100 people in jails, and .003 per
100 in prisons. Population, percent Black, and percent Latino are also all significant
predictors. Furthermore, we see in both cases that failing to control for county-
conservatism biases the coefficient of having a Republican DA upwards, confirming
the presence of omitted variable bias. Further, I do not replicate Krumholz (2019)
in finding that DA partisanship is a significant predictor of prison admissions rates,
both when controlling for conservatism and not. This is due to my choice to include
low-population counties from the data, in Table 12 in the appendix I show that I
do replicate his results when following his methodology, so this is not a result of
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Table 5: Jail Specification Check
Dependent variable:
Jail Admissions Rate
M1 M2 M3 M4
Party R 0.226∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.012 0.209∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.047) (0.054) (0.054)
Conservatism 2.589∗∗∗ 2.730∗∗∗ −0.330 5.617∗∗∗
(0.301) (0.329) (0.433) (0.607)
log(Population 15 to 64) −3.595∗∗∗ −4.712∗∗∗ −4.634∗∗∗ −4.329∗∗∗
(0.234) (0.243) (0.632) (0.309)
% in Poverty 1.278∗∗ −1.179 −2.440∗∗∗ −2.731∗∗∗
(0.558) (0.804) (0.771) (0.763)
log(Median Income) 0.259∗ 0.241 −0.016 −0.409
(0.155) (0.292) (0.304) (0.257)
% Black −9.460∗∗∗ −6.811∗∗∗ −1.955 −6.514∗∗∗
(1.279) (1.325) (3.392) (1.597)
% Latino −2.572∗∗ −1.602 16.623∗∗∗ 4.707∗∗∗
(1.068) (1.116) (2.976) (1.583)
Constant 36.516∗∗∗ 47.401∗∗∗ −9.184 50.042∗∗∗
(2.840) (3.985) (183.414) (4.161)
Observations 28,162 28,162 28,162 28,162
R2 0.804 0.807 0.878 0.846
Adjusted R2 0.789 0.791 0.857 0.820
Residual Std. Error 1.847 1.836 1.519 1.707
(df = 26072) (df = 26054) (df = 23983) (df = 24101)
F Statistic 51.347∗∗∗ 51.681∗∗∗ 41.449∗∗∗ 32.493∗∗∗
(df = 2089) (df = 2107) (df = 4178) (df = 4060)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The four columns correspond to the four models outlined in the empirical model
section. M1 has only county fixed effects, M2 adds categorical year effects, M3 adds
county interacted with time, M4 uses county and commuting zone by 4 years.
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Table 6: Prison Specification Check
Dependent variable:
Prison Admissions Rate
M1 M2 M3 M4
Party R −0.001 −0.003 0.004 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Conservatism 0.327∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.018) (0.022) (0.031)
log(Population 15 to 64) −0.100∗∗∗ −0.159∗∗∗ −0.190∗∗∗ −0.160∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.022) (0.015)
% in Poverty 0.315∗∗∗ −0.163∗∗∗ −0.039 0.059
(0.029) (0.041) (0.040) (0.037)
log(Median Income) 0.166∗∗∗ 0.011 0.007 0.082∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.015) (0.016) (0.013)
% Black −0.033 −0.010 0.226∗ 0.209∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.069) (0.136) (0.078)
% Latino −0.139∗∗ −0.224∗∗∗ −0.014 0.138∗
(0.057) (0.059) (0.122) (0.077)
Constant −0.707∗∗∗ 1.550∗∗∗ 15.348∗ 0.773∗∗∗
(0.148) (0.207) (8.812) (0.201)
Observations 26,630 26,630 26,630 26,630
R2 0.791 0.796 0.865 0.849
Adjusted R2 0.772 0.778 0.841 0.823
Residual Std. Error 0.094 0.093 0.078 0.083
(df = 24432) (df = 24416) (df = 22533) (df = 22621)
F Statistic 42.112∗∗∗ 43.055∗∗∗ 35.400∗∗∗ 31.787∗∗∗
(df = 2197) (df = 2213) (df = 4096) (df = 4008)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The four columns correspond to the four models outlined in the empirical model
section. M1 has only county fixed effects, M2 adds categorical year effects, M3 adds
county interacted with time, M4 uses county and commuting zone by 4 years.
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incorrect data cleaning. However, I do show that DA partisanship is a significant
predictor of jail admissions rates, with Republicans raising it by .2 admissions per
100 people. This is an interesting finding, since DAs have more influence over prison
admissions than jails. DAs prosecute cases and thus have a great deal of influence
in deciding what sentence a guilty verdict will result in, including whether prison
will be included. On the other hand, for jails they are merely deciding whether they
will prosecute a person that has been booked at all, thus deciding whether to keep
them in jail until trial or not. Following the theoretical model, this may imply that
prison admissions are a more salient issue for voters, and thus the DA tries to keep
policy at the preferences of their constituents. All results are below in Table 7 and
I show robustness when clustering standard errors at the county level in Table 17 in
the appendix.
7.3 Rural vs Nonrural
In Table 8, I show the results of splitting the jail data into rural and nonrural. Across
the board, conservatism continues to be highly significant, but the trend with parti-
sanship is more subtle. The effect of DA partisanship on jail admissions completely
disappears in nonrural counties, meaning the trend is being driven entirely by the
rural ones. This is in line with our theoretical model. Since rural counties are the
ones with less competitive races and less information available to voters, they are the
ones where DAs should have the most room to set policy according to their prefer-
ences and away from the median voter’s. We can also see the omitted variable bias
on display here: when we exclude lower population counties and control for conser-
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Table 7: The Effects of Conservatism
Dependent variable:
Jail Admissions Rate Prison Admissions Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Party R 0.209∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.002 0.004
(0.054) (0.054) (0.003) (0.003)
Conservatism 5.617∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗
(0.607) (0.031)
log(Population 15 to 64) −4.329∗∗∗ −4.808∗∗∗ −0.160∗∗∗ −0.177∗∗∗
(0.309) (0.305) (0.015) (0.015)
% in Poverty −2.731∗∗∗ −2.755∗∗∗ 0.059 0.054
(0.763) (0.764) (0.037) (0.037)
log(Median Income) −0.409 −0.197 0.082∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(0.257) (0.256) (0.013) (0.013)
% Black −6.514∗∗∗ −11.114∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ −0.048
(1.597) (1.521) (0.078) (0.075)
% Latino 4.707∗∗∗ 2.866∗ 0.138∗ 0.033
(1.583) (1.573) (0.077) (0.077)
Constant 50.042∗∗∗ 57.662∗∗∗ 0.773∗∗∗ 1.117∗∗∗
(4.161) (4.086) (0.201) (0.199)
Observations 28,162 28,162 26,630 26,630
R2 0.846 0.845 0.849 0.848
Adjusted R2 0.820 0.819 0.823 0.822
Residual Std. Error 1.707 1.710 0.083 0.083
(df = 24101) (df = 24102) (df = 22621) (df = 22622)
F Statistic 32.493∗∗∗ 32.366∗∗∗ 31.787∗∗∗ 31.600∗∗∗
(df = 4060) (df = 4059) (df = 4008) (df = 4007)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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vatism, DA partisanship is insignificant, but if we do not control for conservatism,
partisanship gains enough of the effect that it is pushed into significance at the .1
level13.
In Table 9, I split the prison data into rural and urban. We continue to see that
conservatism is significant, but partisanship is only significant at the .05 level in
nonrural counties when we fail to control for conservatism. I do not believe that this
is an actual effect, merely the guise of one created by omission. While partisanship
is significant at the .1 level when controlling for conservatism, I do not believe we
should take this seriously since the p-value is so low. Further, in Table 16 in the
appendix I show the results of running the regression with clustered standard errors,
this makes partisanship lose significance even at the .1 level, which provides more
evidence to dismiss the result. This all supports the theory I mentioned earlier that
prison admissions rates are a more salient issue than jail admissions rates, because
DAs seem to be willing to personally affect the jail admissions rate, but when it
comes to prisons they are simply creating the policy their constituents desire, and
not setting it closer to their personal preferences since it may jeopardize their election.
7.4 Black and Latino Results
Two variables of interest other than conservatism and partisanship are the racial
demographics of percent Black and percent Latino. In Table 7 we see that percent
Black has a strong negative effect on jail admissions rates, with a weak positive effect
on prison, while percent Latino has positive effects for both. Especially this negative
13For interpretation I only considered results as truly significant if they reached the .05 level
41
Table 8: Splitting the Jail Data into Rural and Nonrural
Dependent variable:
Jail Admissions Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Party R 0.230∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.115 0.166∗
(0.076) (0.076) (0.086) (0.086)
Conservatism 4.576∗∗∗ 6.064∗∗∗
(1.023) (0.891)
log(Population 15 to 64) −5.342∗∗∗ −5.519∗∗∗ −3.200∗∗∗ −3.527∗∗∗
(0.579) (0.578) (0.426) (0.424)
% in Poverty −0.993 −0.953 −5.733∗∗∗ −5.981∗∗∗
(0.937) (0.938) (1.325) (1.327)
log(Median Income) −0.345 −0.243 −0.762∗ −0.514
(0.334) (0.333) (0.403) (0.402)
% Black −10.303∗∗∗ −12.282∗∗∗ −2.516 −8.131∗∗∗
(2.981) (2.950) (1.993) (1.818)
% Latino 11.206∗∗∗ 10.072∗∗∗ −6.933∗∗ −9.464∗∗∗
(2.093) (2.079) (2.748) (2.729)
Constant 54.203∗∗∗ 58.758∗∗∗ 41.888∗∗∗ 48.023∗∗∗
(6.893) (6.822) (5.801) (5.743)
Rural Y Y N N
Observations 16,015 16,015 12,147 12,147
R2 0.867 0.866 0.838 0.837
Adjusted R2 0.837 0.837 0.808 0.808
Residual Std. Error 1.686 1.687 1.644 1.648
(df = 13119) (df = 13120) (df = 10259) (df = 10260)
F Statistic 29.447∗∗∗ 29.408∗∗∗ 28.152∗∗∗ 28.018∗∗∗
(df = 2895) (df = 2894) (df = 1887) (df = 1886)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.0142
Table 9: Splitting the Prison Data into Rural and Nonrural
Dependent variable:
Prison Admissions Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Party R 0.003 0.003 0.006∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Conservatism 0.232∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.039)
log(Population 15 to 64) −0.235∗∗∗ −0.237∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗ −0.125∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.015) (0.016)
% in Poverty 0.050 0.046 0.106∗∗ 0.093∗
(0.051) (0.051) (0.053) (0.053)
log(Median Income) 0.090∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017)
% Black −0.119 −0.195 0.409∗∗∗ −0.021
(0.158) (0.157) (0.081) (0.075)
% Latino 0.163 0.123 0.388∗∗∗ 0.136
(0.113) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112)
Constant 1.570∗∗∗ 1.694∗∗∗ 0.423∗ 0.711∗∗∗
(0.366) (0.365) (0.223) (0.224)
Rural Y Y N N
Observations 15,287 15,287 11,343 11,343
R2 0.839 0.839 0.887 0.885
Adjusted R2 0.803 0.802 0.865 0.863
Residual Std. Error 0.092 0.092 0.065 0.065
(df = 12446) (df = 12447) (df = 9488) (df = 9489)
F Statistic 22.899∗∗∗ 22.873∗∗∗ 40.188∗∗∗ 39.454∗∗∗
(df = 2840) (df = 2839) (df = 1854) (df = 1853)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.0143
percent Black coefficient is confusing, since those familiar with the American criminal
justice system or racial threat theory might expect that more Black people would
cause higher admissions rates. In order to explore this phenomenon more, I regress
partisanship interacted with the racial demographics in Table 10. These interaction
terms have no significance in prisons, and only the percent Latino interaction term
is significant for jails. We continue to see a negative relation between percent Black
and the jail admissions rate. I also try several regressions splitting the data at
10 percent nonwhite, 30 percent, and 50 percent, with the idea that perhaps as
nonwhite demographics grow, they have increased political power and acceptance,
thus explaining the phenomenon, but the result is robust across all data sets. I believe
this should be a topic of further research, because I find this result counter-intuitive.
8 Conclusion
All around, my theoretical model seems to hold up to the data very well. We see
that DA partisanship is only a significant predictor in those counties where the DA
has the most room to create policy outside of the preferences of their voters. Even in
those counties, they only influence jail admissions, not the more salient issue topic of
prison admissions. On whole, I find that Republicans raise the jail admissions rate by
about .239 per 100 people, which is the first such statistic in the literature. However,
this effect is driven almost entirely by rural jails, and becomes indistinguishable from
0 when only considering nonrural areas. I do not find that Republican DAs have an
effect on prison admissions, in contradiction to past literature. I also find strong
44
Table 10: Controlling for Racial Interaction Terms
Dependent variable:
Jail Admissions Rate Prison Admissions Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Party R 0.216∗∗∗ 0.106 0.004 0.002
(0.068) (0.067) (0.003) (0.003)
Conservatism 5.613∗∗∗ 5.583∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗
(0.607) (0.607) (0.031) (0.031)
% Black −6.475∗∗∗ −6.532∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗
(1.615) (1.597) (0.079) (0.078)
% Latino 4.706∗∗∗ 3.725∗∗ 0.138∗ 0.138∗
(1.583) (1.625) (0.077) (0.079)
Party R:% Black −0.060 −0.011
(0.372) (0.018)
Party R:% Latino 1.019∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.382) (0.019)
log(Population 15 to 64) −4.330∗∗∗ −4.328∗∗∗ −0.160∗∗∗ −0.160∗∗∗
(0.309) (0.309) (0.015) (0.015)
% in Poverty −2.727∗∗∗ −2.730∗∗∗ 0.059 0.059
(0.763) (0.763) (0.037) (0.037)
log(Median Income) −0.409 −0.403 0.082∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗
(0.257) (0.257) (0.013) (0.013)
Constant 50.047∗∗∗ 50.110∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗ 0.773∗∗∗
(4.161) (4.161) (0.201) (0.201)
Observations 28,162 28,162 26,630 26,630
R2 0.846 0.846 0.849 0.849
Adjusted R2 0.819 0.820 0.822 0.822
Residual Std. Error 1.707 1.707 0.083 0.083
(df = 24100) (df = 24100) (df = 22620) (df = 22620)
F Statistic 32.483∗∗∗ 32.495∗∗∗ 31.778∗∗∗ 31.778∗∗∗
(df = 4061) (df = 4061) (df = 4009) (df = 4009)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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effects of county-level conservatism on both, with a 1% rise in conservatism leading
to an increase of 5.6 per 100 in jail admissions, a new statistic, and a .343 per 100
increase in prison admissions, which is very similar to the results found by Percival
(2010).
For local economies, these results will have strong impacts. Conservative counties
tend to jail and incarcerate significantly more people, diminishing the availability of
the labor force and pushing people into cycles of debt and poverty. Past studies
have also shown that these actions are neither effective at reducing the crime rate,
nor do they react to changes in it. However, we do find the encouraging result that
politicians largely seem to adhere to the demands of their citizens, meaning that the
status quo can be changed.
For policymakers, activist groups, and thinktanks attempting to alter the Amer-
ican criminal justice system, this result may give some idea of where to lay their
priorities. Winning elections may be of less importance than winning the hearts and
minds of voters on specific policy issues. This means they may want to spend more
money on advertising campaigns to move public opinion.
This result also provides further support in the immediate literature that county-
level conservatism is an important variable that must be taken into consideration
when considering prison and jail admissions rates. However, my measure of this
variable, while clearly predictive, is less than ideal. To measure this properly we
would ideally take a poll of several counties over time to assess their opinions on the
specific policy topic of incarceration and use that as the variable. As it stands, we use
the percent Republican vote share for President to indicate roughly the population’s
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preference for incarceration, and then show that the DA’s partisanship is not of great
importance when accounting for this. While the methodology does work because we
would expect a Republican in office to have stronger opinions than a Republican in
the electorate, we could be more precise by utilizing a series of polls. Further, it is
possible that the percent Republican vote share captures more variables than median
voter preferences, such as cultural effects of conservatism (perhaps conservatives tend
to call the police more often, for example).
My results also call for more nuance in the expanding literature regarding the
impact of local actors. While results may show that local actors have noticeable
effects, where we lay the agency of that impact is important. It is possible that
the local actors themselves play no role, but they simply act as an effective conduit
for the opinions of their voters to become policy. In order to measure this nuance
studies will need to find an effective means of differentiating the actor’s preferences
from those of the people they serve.
Another interesting thing to take into account in future studies, if possible, would
be the impact of local judges and police/sheriff departments. Many judges are elected
on a partisan ticket, others are appointed by partisan officials, and police departments
across the country have a diverse makeup of ideologies. I would strongly suspect
that in a local justice system run by a unified Republican or Democratic party we
would see a much stronger effect than would be predicted by the mere whims of the
electorate.
It would also be interesting to look into those DAs who are not elected, but
appointed. As they do not answer to the electorate that they serve, I would expect
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to see a much lower effect of county conservatism on prison and jail admissions under
such circumstances. Similarly, the states that have a statewide office prosecute may
see different results. It would also be very interesting to look into DAs elected in
nonpartisan elections, since in these elections voters do not have the heuristic of party
to help make a decision, but to do so one would have to research each individual DA
and rank their policies on a conservative to liberal index.
Ultimately, there is much work to be done, but I believe that the results I have
found here provide an insight which future literature can take into account, especially
when ascribing interpretation to their results. This theoretical model is validated by
the data, and until this point, no such model had been proposed whatsoever.
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Table 11: Robustness with logs
Dependent variable:
Jail Admissions Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Party R 194.005∗∗∗ 209.048∗∗∗ 60.067 74.136
(54.548) (54.331) (68.992) (68.747)
conservatism 5,825.961∗∗∗ 5,617.286∗∗∗ 4,999.958∗∗∗ 5,163.377∗∗∗
(619.651) (606.700) (807.422) (779.761)
total pop 15to64 −0.006∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
log(Population 15 to 64) −4,328.674∗∗∗ −3,832.655∗∗∗
(309.122) (377.831)
% in Poverty −2,319.680∗∗∗ −2,730.594∗∗∗ −2,866.864∗∗∗ −3,379.446∗∗∗
(766.159) (763.088) (997.979) (999.191)
medincome −0.014∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗
(0.005) (0.006)
log(Median Income) −408.997 −404.606
(256.723) (332.236)
% Black −8,447.336∗∗∗ −6,514.357∗∗∗ −12,776.740∗∗∗ −10,858.610∗∗∗
(1,594.560) (1,597.195) (1,957.058) (1,961.729)
% Latino 1,751.063 4,706.571∗∗∗ −1,271.363 1,918.928
(1,569.232) (1,583.268) (2,306.025) (2,334.990)
Observations 28,162 28,162 17,303 17,303
R2 0.845 0.846 0.840 0.841
Adjusted R2 0.818 0.820 0.809 0.810
Residual Std. Error 1,712.631 1,707.363 1,605.792 1,601.666
(df = 24101) (df = 24101) (df = 14499)) (df = 14499)
F Statistic 32.257∗∗∗ 32.493∗∗∗ 27.149∗∗∗ 27.316∗∗∗
(df = 4060) (df = 4060) (df = 2803)) (df = 2803)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Regressions (1) and (2) do not exclude counties with population under 25,000
51
Table 12: Krumholz’ regression using my data post-cleaning
Dependent variable:
















Residual Std. Error 66.735 (df = 12699)
F Statistic 47.873∗∗∗ (df = 2642; 12699)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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log(Population 15 to 64) −4.614∗∗∗
(0.314)













Residual Std. Error 1.704 (df = 24087)
F Statistic 32.516∗∗∗ (df = 4074; 24087)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 14: Running Model 3 on Different Urbanicities
Dependent variable:
Jail Admissions Rate
Combined Rural Not Rural
Party R 0.012 −0.026 0.190∗
(0.054) (0.073) (0.098)
conservatism −0.330 0.081 1.371∗∗
(0.433) (0.547) (0.654)
log(Population 15 to 64) −4.634∗∗∗ −6.071∗∗∗ −2.827∗∗∗
(0.632) (0.729) (0.747)
% in Poverty −2.440∗∗∗ −1.227 −4.014∗∗∗
(0.771) (0.954) (1.414)
log(Median Income) −0.016 0.222 −0.745
(0.304) (0.391) (0.491)
% Black −1.955 −9.970∗∗ 0.567
(3.392) (4.183) (3.869)
% Latino 16.623∗∗∗ 3.910 3.911
(2.976) (2.884) (4.314)
year 0.030 0.106 −0.003
(0.092) (0.088) (0.086)
Constant −9.184 −146.845 43.548
(183.414) (177.239) (172.255)
Observations 28,162 16,015 12,147
R2 0.878 0.880 0.858
Adjusted R2 0.857 0.860 0.836
Residual Std. Error 1.519 1.562 1.523
(df = 23983) (df = 13710) (df = 10468)
F Statistic 41.449∗∗∗ 43.740∗∗∗ 37.793∗∗∗
(df = 4178) (df = 2304) (df = 1678)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Party R 0.028 0.066 0.036
(0.058) (0.069) (0.064)
conservatism −0.499 −0.344 −0.343
(0.442) (0.433) (0.434)
log(Population 15 to 64) −4.887∗∗∗ −4.627∗∗∗ −4.626∗∗∗
(0.671) (0.632) (0.632)
% in Poverty −2.438∗∗∗ −2.443∗∗∗ −2.444∗∗∗
(0.773) (0.771) (0.772)
log(Median Income) −0.079 −0.010 −0.011
(0.305) (0.304) (0.304)
% Black −4.679 −1.914 −1.942
(3.597) (3.392) (3.392)
% Latino 16.158∗∗∗ 16.635∗∗∗ 16.634∗∗∗
(3.126) (2.976) (2.976)
year 0.046 0.031 0.031
(0.099) (0.092) (0.092)
pct change Latino −0.001
(0.003)










Constant −37.927 −11.987 −12.345
(197.790) (183.416) (183.437)
Observations 26,183 28,162 28,162
R2 0.887 0.878 0.878
Adjusted R2 0.866 0.857 0.857
Residual Std. Error 1.476 1.519 1.519
(df = 22028) (df = 23981) (df = 23977)
F Statistic 41.580∗∗∗ 41.433∗∗∗ 41.387∗∗∗
(df = 4154) (df = 4180) (df = 4184)
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: (2) uses years since election as continuous, (3) as categorical
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Table 16: Nonrural Prison Regression with County-Clustered Standard Errors















Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 17: Admissions Regressions with County-Clustered Standard Errors
Dependent variable:
















Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 18: Model 4 Robustness when Including Year Dummies
Dependent variable:
Jail Admissions Rate Prison Admissions Rate
(1) (2)




log(Total Population 15-64) −4.614∗∗∗ −0.182∗∗∗
(0.314) (0.015)
% in Povery −1.760∗∗ −0.101∗∗
(0.845) (0.041)
% Black −6.168∗∗∗ 0.119
(1.618) (0.079)




Adjusted R2 0.820 0.824
Residual Std. Error 1.704 (df = 24087) 0.082 (df = 22609)
F Statistic 32.516∗∗∗ (df = 4074; 24087) 32.113∗∗∗ (df = 4020; 22609)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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